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Abstract
In this paper, a gentle introduction to Game Theory is presented in the form of basic
concepts and examples. Minimax and Nash’s theorem are introduced as the formal
definitions for optimal strategies and equilibria in zero-sum and nonzero-sum games.
Several elements of cooperative gaming, coalitions, voting ensembles, voting power and
collective efficiency are described in brief. Analytical (matrix) and extended (tree-
graph) forms of game representation is illustrated as the basic tools for identifying
optimal strategies and “solutions” in games of any kind. Next, a typology of four
standard nonzero-sum games is investigated, analyzing the Nash equilibria and the
optimal strategies in each case. Signaling, stance and third-party intermediates are
described as very important properties when analyzing strategic moves, while credibil-
ity and reputation is described as crucial factors when signaling promises or threats.
Utility is introduced as a generalization of typical cost/gain functions and it is used
to explain the incentives of irrational players under the scope of “rational irrational-
ity”. Finally, a brief reference is presented for several other more advanced concepts of
gaming, including emergence of cooperation, evolutionary stable strategies, two-level
games, metagames, hypergames and the Harsanyi transformation.
Keywords: Game Theory, Minimax theorem, Nash equilibrium, coalitional gaming,
indices of power, voting ensembles, signaling, bluff, credibility, promises, threats, util-
ity function, two-level games, hypergames, evolutionary stable strategies, Harsanyi
transformation, metagames.
GAME THEORY is a vast scientific and research area, based almost entirely on
Mathematics and some experimental methods, with applications that vary from
simple board games to Evolutionary Psychology and Sociology-Biology in group
behavior of humans and animals. Conflict situations are presented everywhere
in the real world, every day, for thousands of years - not only in human societies
but also in animals. The seller and the buyer have to come up with a mutually
acceptable price for the grocery. The employer and the employee have to bargain
in order to reach a mutually satisfying value for the salary. A buyer in an auction
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1 The building blocks 2
has to continuously estimate the cost/gain value of making (or not) the next
higher bid for some object. The primary adversaries in a wolf pack have to
decide when it is beneficial to fight over the leadership and when to stop before
they are severely wounded. A swarm of fish has to collectively “decide” what is
the optimal number and distance of the piket members or “scouts” that serve
as the early warning for the group, perhaps even self-sacrificing if required. All
these cases are typical examples, simpler or more complex, of conflict situations
that depend on bargaining, coordination and evolutionary optimization. Game
Theory provides a unified framework with robust mathematical foundations for
the proper formulation and analysis of such systems.
1 The building blocks
In principle, the mathematical theory of games and gaming was first developed
as a model for situations of conflict. Game Theory is the area of research that
provides mathematical formulations and a proper framework for studying ad-
versarial situations. Although E. Borel looked at similar problems in the 1920s,
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern provided two breakthrough papers
(1928, 1937) as a kick-start of the field. Since the early 1940’s, with the end
of World War II and stepping into the era of the Cold War that followed, the
work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern has provided a solid foundation for the
most simple types of games, as well as analytical forms for their solutions, with
many applications to Economics, Operations Research and Logistics. However,
there are several limitations that fail to explain various aspects of real-world
conflicts [25], especially when the human factor is a major factor. The applica-
tion of game-theoretic formulations in designing experiments in Psychology and
Sociology is usually referred to as gaming [46, 6].
1.1 Games, strategies and solutions
The term game is the mathematical formulation of adversarial situations, where
two or more players are involved in competitive or cooperative acts. The zero-
sum games are able to model situations of conflict between two or more players,
where one’s gain is the other’s loss and vice versa. Most military problems can
be modeled as some form of two-player zero-sum game. When the structure of
the game and the rationale of the players is known to all, then the game is one
of complete information, while if some of these information is somehow hidden
or unknown to some players, it is one of incomplete information. Furthermore,
if all players are fully informed about their opponents’ decisions, the game is
one of perfect information. In contrast, if some of the information about the
other players’ moves, the game is one of partial or imperfect information. Such
games of both complete and perfect information are all board games, like Chess,
Go and Checkers, and they are all zero-sum by nature.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [48] proved that there is at least one optimal
plan of decisions or strategy for each player in all zero-sum games, as well as
a solution to the game that comes naturally as a result of all players following
their optimal strategies. At the game’s solution, each player can guarantee that
the maximum gain an opponent can gain is kept under a specific minimal limit,
defined only by this player’s own strategy. This assertion was formulated as a
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theorem called Minimax and in the simple case of two opposing players with
only two strategies each the Minimax solution of the game can be calculated
analytically as a solution of a 2x2 set of linear equations, which determine the
stable solution or saddle-point.
The consequences of the Minimax theorem have been thoroughly studied
for many years after its proof. As an example, it mathematically proves the
assertion that all board games, including the most complex ones like Chess,
have at least one solution, i.e., an optimal (pure) strategy for both players that
can be analytically calculated, at least in theory [44, 46, 37]. Of course, in
the case of Chess the game space is so huge that it is still unfeasible today
to calculate this theoretically optimal strategy, even with the help of parallel
processing in supercomputers. In contrast, Checkers is a much smaller (3x3)
and simpler game, making it possible to create the complete game space in any
typical desktop computer1 and calculate the exact optimal strategy - in fact, it
is the same strategy that every child soon learns by trial-and-error, playing in
a way that always leads to a win or a draw (never loose).
In general, if the chosen strategy of one player is known to its opponent,
then an optimal counter-strategy is always available. Hence, in simultaneous
games where the opposing moves are conducted at the same time, each player
would normally try not to employ a deterministic way of choosing its strategy
and conceal this choice until the very last moment. However, the Minimax
theorem provides a mathematically solid way of nullifying any stochastic aspect
in determining the opponent’s choice and, in essence, make its exact choice
irrelevant: no matter what the opponent does, the Minimax solution ensures
the minimum losses to each player, given a specific game setup. In other words,
it provides an analytic way to determine the best defensive strategy, instead
of a preference to offensive strategies. In some zero-sum games this leads to
one stable outcome or equilibrium, where each player would have no incentive
not to choose its Minimax strategy; however, if this choice leads to a negative
handicap for this player if it is known with complete certainty by the others,
then this choice should not be manifested as certain. In practice this means that
the Minimax solution would not be any single one of the player’s pure strategies
but rather a weighted combination of them in a mixed strategy scheme, where
each weight corresponds to the probability of choosing one of the available pure
strategies via a random mechanism. This notion of using mixtures of pure
strategies for randomly choosing between them leads to a false sense of security
in single-turn games, since the optimality of the expected outcome of the mixed
strategy scheme refers to the asymptotic (long-term) and not the “spot” (one-
shot) payoff. Moreover, a game may involve an infinite number of strategies
for the players, in a discrete or continuous set; in this case the game is labeled
as continuous or infinite, while a finite game is one with a limited number of
1 In Checkers, the board size is 3x3 and each position can be either empty or host the mark
of of one of the two players, “X” or “O”. Hence, if the two players are treated as interchangeable
(i.e., who plays first) and no other symmetries are considered, the total number of all possible
distinct board setups is: 9 · 8 · . . . · 2 · 1 = 9! = 362, 880. After applying the game rules and
pruning the game tree for early stops (with incomplete boards), the true number of game
states is about 2/3 of that set. Using simple tree-node representation for each board setup,
e.g. a 3-value 9-positions vector dictionary (= 39 ' 214.265 ≤ 215 < 216 = 2 bytes), such a
program would only require about 484 KB or less than 0.5 MB. This is roughly the size of a
small-sized photo taken by the camera of a low-end smart-phone today, while in the ’80s this
was almost the total size of RAM in a typical PC.
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(discrete) strategies [14, 46].
When the game is inherently repetitive or iterative, i.e., includes multiple
turns and not just one, even the pure strategy suggested by Minimax should
not be chosen deterministically in every turn if according to the game setup
this information might provide a handicap to the opponent. This is a topic of
enthusiastic discussion about the optimality of the Minimax solution and its
inherent defensive nature, as it is not clear in general when information about
an opponent’s next move is available and trustworthy enough to justify any
deviation from this Minimax strategy.
Summary:
• In zero-sum games, one player’s gains is another’s losses (and vice
versa).
• Information about the game structure and the opponents’ moves
may be complete or not, perfect or not.
• All board games are inherently zero-sum, of complete and perfect
information.
• The Minimax theorem assures that all board games have at least
one theoretically optimal way to play them, although its exact
calculation may be unfeasible in practice for some games (e.g.
Chess, Go).
• The Minimax solution of a game is the combination of players’
strategies that lead to an equilibrium or saddle-point.
1.2 Nonzero-sum games and Nash equilibria
Although the Minimax theorem provided a solid base for solving many types
of games, it is only applicable in practice for the zero-sum type of games. In
reality, it is common that in a conflict not all players receive their opponents’
looses as their own gain and vice versa. In other words, it is very common
a specific combination of decisions between the players to result in a certain
amount of “loss” to one and a corresponding “gain”, not of equal magnitude, to
another. In this case, the game is called nonzero-sum and it requires a new
set of rules for estimating optimal strategies and solutions. As each player’s
gains and losses are not directly related to the opponents’, the optimal solution
is only based on the assertion that it should be the one that ensures that the
player has “no regrets” when choosing between possible decision options. This
essentially means that, since each player is now interested in his/her own gains
and losses, the optimal solution should only focus on maximizing each player’s
own expectations [33, 28, 13]. The Minimax property can still be applied in
principle when the single most “secure” option must be identified, but now the
solution of the game gains a new meaning.
During the early 1950’s, John Nash has focused primarily on the problem
of finding a set of equilibrium points in nonzero-sum games, where the players
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eventually settle after a series of competitive rounds of the game [29, 30]. The
failure of the Minimax approach to predict real-world outcomes in nonzero-sum
games comes from the fact that the players are assumed to act independently
and simultaneously, while in reality they usually are not. Experience shows that
possibly better payoffs with what a player might choose, after observing the
opponent’s moves, is a very strong motivator when choosing its actual strategy
[27]. In strict mathematical terms, these equilibrium points would not be the
same in essence with the Minimax solutions, as they would come as a result of
the players’ competitive behavior over several “turns” of moves and not as an
algebraic solution of the mathematical formulation in a single-turn game.
In 1957 Nash has successfully proved that indeed such equilibrium points ex-
ist in all nonzero-sum games, in a way that is analogous to the Minimax theorem
assertion. This new type of stable outcome is referred to as Nash equilibrium
after his name and can be considered a generalization of the corresponding Min-
imax equilibrium in zero-sum games. In essence, they are the manifestation of
the no regrets principle for all players, i.e., not regretting their final choice after
observing their opponents’ behavior [44, 46]. However, although the Nash the-
orem ensures that at least one such Nash equilibrium exists in all nonzero-sum
games, there is no clear indication on how the game’s solution can be analyti-
cally calculated at this point. In other words, although a solution is known to
exist, there is no closed form for nonzero-sum games until today. Seminal works
by C. Daskalakis & Ch. Papadimitriou in 2006-2007 and on have proved that,
while Nash equilibria exist, they may be unattainable and/or practically impos-
sible to calculate due to the inherent algorithmic complexity of this problem,
e.g. see: [12, 34].
It should be noted that players participating in a nonzero-sum game may or
may not have the same options available as alternative course of action, or the
same set of options may lead to different gains or payoffs between the players.
When players are fully interchangeable and their ordering in the game makes not
difference to the game setup and its solutions, the game is called symmetrical.
Otherwise, if exchanging players’ position does not yield a proportional exchange
of their payoffs, then the game is called asymmetrical. Naturally, symmetrical
games lead to Nash equilibrium points that appear in pairs, as an exchange
between players creates its symmetrical counterpart.
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Summary:
• In nonzero-sum games, the payoffs of the players are separated
(although may be correlated).
• If players are allowed to observe their opponents moves over sev-
eral iterations, then the “no regrets” principle is a strong incentive
to revise their own strategies, even though their payoffs are sepa-
rated.
• The Nash equilibrium theorem ensures that, under these condi-
tions, there are indeed stable solutions in nonzero-sum games,
similarly to the Minimax theorem for zero-sum games.
• However, calculating the optimal strategies and the game solution
for these Nash equilibria is a vastly more complex and generally
unfeasible task.
2 Cooperation instead of competitiveness
The seminal work of Nash and others in nonzero-sum games was a breakthrough
in understanding the outcome in real-world adversarial situations. However, the
Nash equilibrium points are not always the globally optimal option for the play-
ers. In fact, the Nash equilibrium is optimal only when players are strictly
competitive, i.e., when there is no chance for a mutually agreed solution that
benefits them more. These strictly competitive forms of games are called non-
cooperative games. The alternative option, the one that allows communication
and prior arrangements between the players, is called a cooperative game and
it is generally a much more complicated form of nonzero-sum gaming. Natu-
rally, there is no option of having cooperative zero-sum games, since the game
structure itself prohibits any other settlement between the players other than
the Minimax solution.
2.1 The cooperative option
The problem of cooperative or possibly cooperative gaming is the most common
form of conflict in real life situations. Since nonzero-sum games have at least one
equilibrium point when studied under the strictly competitive form, Nash has
extensively studied the cooperative option as an extension to it. However, the
possibility of finding and mutually adopting a solution that is better for both
players than the one suggested by the Nash equilibrium, essentially involves a set
of behavioral rules regarding the players’ stance and “mental” state, rather than
strict optimality procedures [27]. Nash named this process a bargain between the
players, trying to mutually agree on one solution between multiple candidates
within a bargaining set or negotiation set. In practice, each player should enter a
bargaining procedure if and only if there is a chance that a cooperative solution
exists and it provides at least the same gain as the best strictly competitive
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solution, i.e., the best Nash equilibrium. In this case, if such a solution is
agreed between the players, it is called bargaining solution of the game [28, 33].
As mentioned earlier, each player acts upon the property of no regrets, i.e.,
follow the decisions that maximize their own expectations. Nevertheless, the
game setup itself provides means of improving the final gain in an agreed solu-
tion. In some cases, the bargaining process may involve the option of threats,
that is a player may express the intention to follow a strategy that is particularly
costly for the opponent. Of course, the opponent can do the same, focusing on a
similar threat. This procedure is still a cooperative bargaining process, with the
threshold of expectations raised for both players. The result of such a process
may be a mutually deterring solution, which in this case is called a threatening
solution or threat equilibrium. There is also evidence that, while cooperative
strategies do exist, in some cases “cooperation” may be the result of extortion
between players with unbalanced power and choices [36].
In his work, Nash has formulated a general and fairly logical set of six axioms,
the Nash’s bargaining axioms, regarding the behavior of rational players, in
order to establish a non-empty bargaining set, i.e., to have at least one stable
solution (equilibrium) [28, 33, 29]. In non-strict form, these axioms can be
summarized in the following propositions:
• Any of the cooperative options under consideration must be feasible and
yield at least the same payoff as the best strictly non-cooperative option
for all players, i.e., cooperation must be mutually beneficial.
• Strict (mathematical) constraints: Pareto optimality, independence of ir-
relevant alternatives, invariance under linear transformations, symmetry
[46, 33, 28].
The first proposition essentially defines the term “rationality” for a player:
he/she always acts with the goal of maximizing own gains and minimizing losses,
regardless if this means strictly competitive or possibly cooperative behavior.
The second proposition names a set of strict mathematical preconditions (not
always satisfied in practice), in order for such a bargaining set to exist. Having
settled on these axioms, Nash was able to prove the corresponding bargaining
theorem: under these axioms, there exists such a bargaining process, it is unique
and it leads to a bargaining solution, i.e., equilibrium. However, as in the general
case of strictly competitive games, Nash’s bargaining theorem does not provide
analytical means of finding such solutions.
The notion of bargaining sets and threat equilibrium is often extended in
special forms of games that include iterative or recursive steps in gaming, either
in the form of multi-step analysis (meta-games) or focusing on the transitional
aspects of the game (differential games). Modern research is focused on methods
that introduce probabilistic models into games of multiple realizations and/or
multiple stages [33].
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Summary:
• In nonzero-sum games, there may be non-competitive (coopera-
tive) options that are mutually beneficial to all players.
• Under some general rationality principles, Nash’s bargaining theo-
rem ensures that these cooperative outcomes may indeed become
the game solution, provided that strict competitiveness yields
lower gains for all.
• The procedure of structuring the “common ground” of cooperation
between the players, normally conducted over several iterations,
is the bargaining process.
2.2 Coalitions, stable sets, the Core
Nash’s work on the Nash equilibrium and bargaining theorem provides the nec-
essary means to study n-person non-cooperative and cooperative games under
a unifying point of view. Specifically, a nonzero-sum game can be realized as
a strictly competitive or a possibly cooperative form, according to the game’s
rules and restrictions. Therefore, the cooperative option can be viewed as a
generalization to the strictly competitive mode of gaming.
When players are allowed to cooperate in order to agree on a mutually
beneficial solution of game, they essentially choose one strategy over the others
and bargain this option with all the others in order to come to an agreement.
For symmetrical games, this is like each player chooses to join a group of other
players with similar preference over their initial choice. Each of these groups is
called a coalition and it constitutes the basic module in this new type of gaming:
the members of each coalition act as cooperative players joined together and at
the same time each coalition competes over the others in order to impose its own
position and become the winning coalition. This setup is very common when
modeling voting schemes, where the group that captures the relative majority
of the votes becomes the winner.
Coalition Theory is closely related to the classical Game Theory, especially
the cooperating gaming [33, 28]. In essence, each player still tries to maximize
its own expectations, not individually any more but instead as part of a greater
opposing term. Therefore, the individual gains and capabilities of each player
is now considered in close relation to the coalition this player belongs, as well
as how its individual decision to join or leave a coalition affects this coalition’s
winning position. As in classic nonzero-sum games, the notion of equilibrium
points and solutions is considered under the scope of domination or not in the
game at hand. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of having competing
coalitions of cooperative players is purely combinatorial in nature, thus making
its analysis very complex and cumbersome. There are also special cases of
collective decision schemes where a single player is allowed to abstain completely
from the voting procedure, or prohibit a contrary outcome of the group via a
veto option.
In order to study the properties of a single player participating in a game
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of coalitions, it is necessary to analyze the wining conditions of each coalition.
Usually each player is assigned a fixed value of “importance” or “weight” when
participating in this type of games and each coalition’s power is measured as a
sum over the individual weights of all players participating in this coalition. The
coalition that ends up with the highest cumulative value of power is the winning
coalition. Therefore, it is clear that, while each player’s power is related to its
individual weight, this relation is not directly mapped on how the participation
in any arbitrary coalition may affect this coalition’s winning or losing position.
As this process stands true for all possible coalitions that can be formed, this
competitive type of “claiming” over the available pool of players/voters by each
coalition suggests that there are indeed configurations that marginally favor the
one or the other coalition, i.e., a set of “solutions”.
The notion of solution in coalition games is somewhat different from the one
suggested for typical nonzero-sum games, as it identifies minimal settings for
coalitions that dominate all the others. In other words, they do not identify
points of maximal gain for a player or even a coalition, but equilibrium “points”
that determine which of the forming coalitions is the winning one. This type
of “solutions” in coalition games is defined in close relation to domination and
stability of such points and they are often referred to as the Core. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern have defined a somewhat more relaxed definition of such con-
ditions and the corresponding solutions are called stable sets [33, 28]. It should
be noted that, in contrast to Nash’s theorems and the Minimax assertion of
solutions, there is generally no guarantee that solutions in the context of the
Core and stable sets need to exist in an arbitrary coalition game.
Summary:
• Players of similar preferences and mutual benefits may join in
groups or coalitions; these coalitions may be competing with each
other, similarly to competitive games between single players.
• The study of games between coalitions is inherently more complex
than with single players, as in this case every player contributes
to the collective “power” and enjoys a share of the wins.
• In general, coalitions are formed and structured under the scope
of voting ensembles, where the voting weight of each individual
player contributes to the combined weight of the coalition.
2.3 Indices of power in committees
The notion of the Core and stable sets in coalition gaming is of vital importance
when trying to identify the winning conditions and the relative power of each
individual player in affecting the outcome of the game. The observation that
a player’s weight in a weighted system may not intuitively correspond to its
voting “power” goes back at least to Shapley and Shubik (1954). For example, a
specific weight distribution to the players may make them relatively equivalent
in terms of voting power, while only a slight variation of the weights may render
some of them completely irrelevant on determining the winning coalition [45].
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Shapley and Shubik (1954) and later Banzhaf and Coleman (1965, 1971)
suggested a set of well-defined equations for calculating the relative power of
each player, as well as each forming coalitions as a whole [33, 28]. The Shapley-
Shubik index of power is based on the calculation of the actual contribution of
each player entering a coalition, in terms of improving a coalition’s gain and
winning position. Similarly, the Banzhaf-Coleman index of power calculates
how an individual player’s decision to join or leave a coalition (“swing vote”)
results in a winning or loosing position for this coalition, accordingly. Both
indexes are basically means of translating each player’s individual importance
or weight within the coalition game into a quantitative measure of power in
terms of determining the winner. While both indices include combinatorial
realizations, the Banzhaf index is usually easier to calculate, as it is based on
the sum of “shifts” on the winning condition a player can incur [5]. Furthermore,
its importance in coalition games is made clearer when the Banzhaf index is
viewed as the direct result of calculating the derivatives of a weighted majority
game (WMG).
Seminal work by L. S. Penrose [35], as well as more recent studies with com-
puter simulations [8], have shown that this discrepancy between voting weights
and actual voting power is clearly evident when there is large variance in the
weighting profile and/or when the voting group has less than 12-15 members.
Even in large voting pools, the task of designing optimal voting mechanisms
and protocols with regard to some collective efficiency criterion is one of the
most challenging topics in Decision Theory.
Summary:
• Weighted majority games (WMG) are the typical theoretical struc-
tures of the process of formulating the collective decision within a
coalition.
• In voting ensembles, each player’s voting weight is not directly
proportional to his/her true voting power within the group, i.e.,
the level of steering the collective decision towards its own choices.
2.4 Voting ensembles and majority winners
In most cases, majority functions that are employed in practice very simplistic
when it comes to weighting distribution profile or they imply a completely uni-
form weight distribution. However, a specific weighting profile usually produces
better results, provided that is simple enough to be applied in practice and
attain a consensus in accepting it as “fair” by the voters. Taylor and Zwicker
[45] have defined a voting system as trade robust if an arbitrary series of trades
among several winning coalitions can never simultaneously render them losing.
Furthermore, they proved that a voting system is trade robust if and only if it
is weighted. This means that, if appropriate weights are applied, at least one
winning coalition can benefit from this procedure.
As an example, institutional policies usually apply a non-uniform voting
scheme when it comes to collective board decisions. This is often referred to
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as the “inner cabinet rule”. In a hospital, senior staff members may attain
increased voting power or the chairman may hold the right of a tie-breaking
vote. It has been proven both in theory and in practice that such schemes are
more efficient than simple majority rules or any restricted versions of them like
trimmed means. Nitzan and Paroush [32] have studied the problem of optimal
weighted majority rules (WMR) extensively and they have proved that they are
indeed the optimal decision rules for a group of decision makers in dichotomous
choice situations. This proof was later extended by Ben-Yashar and Paroush,
from dichotomous to polychotomous choice situations [3]; hence, the optimality
of the WMR formulation has been proven theoretically for any n-label voting
task.
The weight optimization procedure has been applied experimentally in trained
or other types of combination rules, but analytical solutions for the weights is
not commonly used. However, Shapley and Grofman [42] have established that
an analytical solution for the weighting profile exists and it is indeed related
to the individual player skill levels or competencies [23]. Specifically, if deci-
sion independence is assumed for the participating players, the optimal weights
in a WMR scheme can be calculated as the log-odds of their respective skill
probabilities, i.e.:
wk = log (Ok) = log
(
pk
1− pk
)
(2.1)
where pk is the competency of player k and wk is its corresponding voting
weight. Interestingly enough, this is exactly the solution found by analytical
Bayesian-based approaches in the context of decision fusion of independent ex-
perts in Machine Learning [24]. The optimality assertion regarding the WMR,
together with an analytical solution for the optimal weighting profile, provides
an extremely powerful tool for designing theoretically optimal collective deci-
sion rules. Even when the independence assumption is only partially satisfied
in practice, studies have proved that WMR-based models employing log-odds
weighting profiles for combining pattern classifiers confirm these theoretical re-
sults [19, 18].
Summary:
• Weighted majority rules (WMR) have been proven theoretically
as the optimal decision-making structures in weighted majority
games.
• The log-odds model has been proven both as the theoretically op-
timal way to weight the individual player’s votes, provided that
they decide independently.
• The optimality of the log-odds weighting method has also been
proven experimentally, even when the independence assumption
is only partially satisfied.
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2.5 Collective efficiency
Condorcet (1785) [9] was the first to address the problem of how to design
and evaluate an efficient voting system, in terms of fairness among the people
that participating in the voting process, as well as the optimal outcome for
the winner(s). This first attempt to create a probabilistic model of a voting
body is known today as the Condorcet Jury Theorem [51]. In essence, this
theorem says that if each of the voting individuals is somewhat more likely
than not to make the “better” choice from a set of alternative options; and if
each individual makes its own choice independently from all the others, then the
probability that the group majority is “correct” is greater than the individual
probabilities of the voters. Moreover, this probability of correct choice by the
group increases as the number of independent voters increases. In practice, this
means that if each voter decides independently and performs marginally higher
than 50%, then a group of such voters is guaranteed to perform better than
each of the participating individuals. This assertion has been used in Social
sciences for decades as a proof that decentralized decision making, like in a
group of juries in a court, performs better than centralized expertise, i.e., a sole
judge. The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its implications have been used as one
guideline for estimating the efficiency of any voting system and decision making
in general [51]. Under this context, the coalition games are studied by applying
quantitative measures on collective competence and optimal distribution of power
in the ensemble, e.g. tools like the Banzhaf or Shapley indices of power. The
degree of consistency of such a voting scheme on establishing the pair-wise
winner(s), as the Condorcet Jury Theorem indicates, is often referred to as the
Condorcet criterion.
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Coleman are only two of several formulations
for the indices of power in voting ensembles, each defining different payoff dis-
tributions or realizations among the members of winning coalitions. In general,
these formulations are collectively referred to as semivalue functions or semi-
values and they are considered more or less equivalent in principle, although
may be different in exact values. Almost all of them are based on combinatorial
functions (inclusion-exclusion operations in subsets) and, as a result, there is
no easy way to formulate proper inverse functions that can be calculated in
polynomial time. Therefore, the design of exact voting profiles with weights
based on semivalues, instead of competencies as described above (log-odds), is
generally impractical even for ensembles of small sizes.
For further insight on weighted majority games, weighted majority voting,
collective decision efficiency and Condorcet efficiency, as well as applications to
Machine Learning for designing pattern classifiers, see [17, 19, 18].
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Tab. 1: Generic 2x2 zero-sum game in analytical form.
Game
example
Player-2
y 1− y
Player-1 x a b
1− x c d
Summary:
• Under the assumption of independent voters and that each de-
cides “correctly” marginally higher than 50% of the time, then
their collective decision as a group is theoretically proven to be
asymptotically better any single member of the ensemble.
• Furthermore, as the size of the ensemble increases, its collective
competency is guaranteed to increase too.
• In the other hand, the problem of formulating an analytical so-
lution for the optimal distribution of voting power within such a
group, i.e., the design of theoretically optimal voting mechanisms,
is still an open research topic.
3 Game analysis & solution concepts
One of the most important factors in understanding and analyzing games cor-
rectly is the way they are represented. Games can be represented and analyzed
in two generic formulations: (a) the analytical or normal form, where each
player is manifested as one dimension and its available choices (strategies) as
offsets on it, and (b) the extensive or tree-graph form, where each player’s “move”
correspond to a node split in a tree representation. Each one of them has its
own advantages and disadvantages, but theoretically they are equivalent.
3.1 Games in analytical (matrix) form
In Table 1, an example of a zero-sum game in analytical form is presented.
Player-1 is usually referred to as the “max” player and Player-2 is referred to as
the “min” player, while rows and columns correspond to each player’s available
strategies, respectively. Since this is a zero-sum game and one player’s gains
is the other player’s losses, the “max” player tries to maximize the game value
(outcome) while the “min” player tries to minimize it. In the context of the
Minimax theorem, Player-2 chooses the maximum-of-minimums, while Player-2
chooses the minimum-of-maximums. The x and y correspond to the weight or
probability of choosing the first strategy and, since this is a 2x2 game, the other
strategies are attributed with the complementary probabilities, 1-x and 1-y.
The exact Minimax solution for x and y depends solely on the values of the
individual payoffs for each of the four outcomes. Here, it is assumed that there is
no domination in strategies, i.e., there is no row/column that is strictly “better”
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Tab. 2: Example 2x2 zero-sum game in analytical form.
Game
example
Player-2
(0) (1)
Player-1 (0) 0 -3(1) 4 1
Tab. 3: Example of a 2x2 nonzero-sum game in analytical form.
Game
example
Player-2
y 1− y
Player-1 x (a1,a2) (b1,b2)
1− x (c1,c2) (d1,d2)
than another row/column (column-wise/row-wise, respectively, all payoffs). For
example, Player-1 would have a dominating strategy in the first row if and only
if a ≥ c and b ≥ d. Based on this generic setup, this is a typical 2x2 system of
linear equations and, if no domination is present, its solution can be determined
analytically as [44, 14, 26]:
[x, 1− x] =
[
d− c
a− b− c+ d ,
a− b
a− b− c+ d
]
(3.1)
[y, 1− y] =
[
d− b
a− b− c+ d ,
a− c
a− b− c+ d
]
(3.2)
u =
ad− bc
a− b− c+ d (3.3)
The Minimax solution [x, y] determines the saddle-point, i.e., the equilibrium
that is reached when both opponents play optimally in the Minimax sense, when
the game has no pure (non-mixed) solution. In this case, the expected payoff
or value of the game for both players is calculated by u (remember, this is a
zero-sum game). If the game has a pure solution, then it is determined as either
0 or 1 for each probability x and y. Table 2 illustrates a zero-sum game and the
corresponding pure Minimax solution, by selecting the appropriate strategies for
each player. In this case, “max” Player-1 chooses the the maximum {1} between
the two minimum values {-3,1} from its own two possible worst-case outcomes,
while “min” Player-2 chooses the the minimum {1} between the two maximum
values {4,1} from its own two possible worst-case outcomes. Hence, the pure
solution [1,1] is the Minimax outcome.
In nonzero-sum games, the analytical form is still a matrix, but now the pay-
offs for each player are separate, as illustrated in Table 3. Here, since the payoffs
are separated, both players are treated as “max” and the Minimax solution for
each one is calculated by selecting the maximum-of-minimums as described be-
fore for zero-sum games, focused solely on its own payoffs from each value pair.
Although a (pure) Minimax solution can always be calculated for nonzero-
sum games, the exact Nash equilibrium solution is a non-trivial task that cannot
be solved analytically in the general case. However, pure Nash equilibrium
outcomes can be identified by locating any payoff pairs (z, w) such that z is
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Tab. 4: Example of a 2x2 nonzero-sum game with one Nash equilibrium at
[A,B ]:(2,4).
Game
example
Player-2
A B
Player-1 A (3,3) (2*,4*)B (4*,1) (1,2*)
the maximum of its column and w is the maximum of its row. In other words,
every row for Player-1 is scanned and every entry in it is compared to the values
in the same column, marking it if it is the maximum among them; the same
process is conducted for every column for Player-2, scanning each value row-wise
for its maximum; any payoff pair that has both values marked as maximums
is a Nash equilibrium in the game. Table 4 illustrates such an example, where
asterisk (*) marks the identified max-values and the single Nash equilibrium
for [A,B ] at (2,4). Here, although the strategies are the same for both players,
their (separated) payoffs are not, hence the game is referred to as asymmetric.
According to the oddness theorem by Wilson (1971), the Nash equilibria almost
always appear in odd numbers [44, 33], at least for non-degenerate games, where
mixed strategies are calculated upon k linearly independent pure strategies.
Summary:
• Game representation in analytical form introduces a game matrix,
with row and column positions associated to the strategies available
to the players and contents associated to the corresponding payoffs.
• Analytical-form representation introduces very convenient ways to
identify Minimax solutions and Nash equilibria in games.
• However, they are appropriate mostly for 2-player simultaneous
games, since any other configuration cannot be fully illustrated.
3.2 Games in extensive (tree-graph) form
In the extensive form the game is represented as a tree-graph, where each node
is a state labeled by a player’s number and each (directed) edge is a player’s
choice or “move”. Strictly speaking, this is a form of state-transition diagram
that illustrates how the game evolves as the players choose their strategies.
Figure 3.1 shows such a 2x2 nonzero-sum game of perfect information, while
Figure 3.2 shows a similar 2x2 game of imperfect information [46, 28, 49, 41,
16, 14]. Nodes with numbers indicate players, edges with letters indicate chosen
strategies (here, symmetric) and separated payoffs (in parentheses) indicate the
game outcome after one full round. The dashed line between the two nodes
for Player-2 indicate that its current true state is not clearly defined due to
imperfect information regarding Player-1’s move. In practice, these two states
form an information set for Player-2, which has no additional information to
differentiate between them. This is also valid in the case of simultaneous moves,
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Fig. 3.1: Example of a 2x2 nonzero-sum game of perfect information.
where Player-2 cannot observe Player-1’s move in advance of its own, and vice
versa. In extensive form, an information set is indicated by a dotted line or by
a loop, connecting all nodes in that set.
The extensive form of game is usually the preferred way to represent the
tree-graph of simple 2-player board games, where each node is clearly a state
and each edge is a player’s move. Even in single-player games, where a puzzle
has to be solved through a series of moves (e.g. Rubik’s cube)2, the tree-graph
is a very effective way to organize the game under an algorithmic perspective, in
order to program a “solver” in a computer. In practice, the problem is structured
as sequences of states and transitions in a tree-graph manner and the “game”
is explored as it is evolving, move after move, expanding the tree-graph from
every terminal node. The tree-graph can be expanded either by full a level
(“breadth-first”), or from a branch all the way down to non-expandable terminal
nodes (“depth-first”), or some hybrid scheme between these two alternatives.
As described above, small games like Checkers can be structured and ex-
panded fully, with their tree-graph having only internal (already expanded) and
terminal nodes; however, in larger games like Chess or Go this is practically
unfeasible even with super-computers. In such cases, the algorithm should as-
sess the “optimality” of each expandable terminal node with regard to relevance
towards the predefined goal (“win” or “solution”), sort all these nodes according
to their ranking and choose the “best” ones for expansion in the next iteration.
This way, the search is sub-optimal but totally feasible with almost any mem-
ory constraints - this is exactly how most computer players are programmed
for playing board games or solving complex puzzle games. In Artificial Intelli-
gence, algorithms like A* and AB solve this type of problems as a path-finding
optimization procedure towards a specified goal [40, 31].
2 The combinatorial analysis of the classic 3x3x6 Rubik’s cube should take into account
tile permutations that can only be reached by the available shifts and turns of the slices of
the device. Therefore, a totally “free” permutation scheme would produce: 8! · 38 · 12! · 212 =
519, 024, 039, 293, 878, 272, 000 cube instances, while in practice the possible permutations are
only: 8!·37 ·(12!/2)·211 = 43, 252, 003, 274, 489, 856, 000 cube instances (about 12 times fewer)
[50].
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Fig. 3.2: Example of a 2x2 nonzero-sum game of imperfect information.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the way a path-finding algorithm like A* would work
in expanding a tree-graph as described above. The “root” node is the starting
state in a puzzle game (single-player) and each node represents a new state
after a valid move. The numbers indicate the sequence in which the nodes are
expanded, according to some optimality-ranking function (not relevant here).
For example, node “4” in the 3rd level is expanded before node “5” in the 2nd
level, node “21” in the 5th level is expanded before node “22” in the 3rd level,
etc. Here, node “30” in the 5th level is the last and most relevant terminal node
(still expandable) towards the goal, hence the optimal path from the “root” state
is currently the: “5”→“7”→“11”→“30” and the next “best” single-step move is
the one towards “5”. The tree-graph can be expanded in an arbitrary number
of levels according to the current memory constraints for the program, but the
same path-finding procedure has to be reset and re-applied after the realization
of each step when two or more players are involved, since every response from
the opponent effectively nullifies every other branch of the tree-graph.
It should be mentioned that, although the extensive form of game represen-
tation is often inefficient for large games like Chess, it can be used as a tool in
the proof of the existence of an optimal solution [15, 46]. Specifically, in every
such game of complete and perfect information (all board games), each player
knows its exact position in the graph-tree prior to choosing the next move. In
other words, each player is not only aware of the complete structure of the game
but also knows all the past moves of the game, including the ones of random
choice. Hence, since there is no uncertainty in the moves, each player can remove
the dominated strategies and subsequently identify the optimal choice, which is
always a pure strategy, i.e., the one that corresponds to the saddle-point of the
game. This proof actually ensures the existence of a (pure) optimal strategy
in every typical board game, no matter how large or complex it is. Examples
include Tic-Tac-Toe, Chess, Backgammon, etc.
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Fig. 3.3: Example of the way a path-finding algorithm like A* would work in
expanding the tree-graph of a single-player “puzzle” game like Rubik’s
cube.
Summary:
• Game representation in extended form introduces a tree-graph, with
nodes associated to individual players and (directed) edges associated
to selected strategies (“moves”).
• Extended-form representation introduces very convenient ways to
identify chains of moves and solution paths.
• However, the calculation of Minimax solutions and Nash equilibria is
not straight-forward.
4 The four interesting cases
In the real world, games may be either zero-sum or nonzero-sum by nature.
As described previously, the case of zero-sum games can be considered simpler
and much easier to solve analytically, since it can be formulated as a typical
algebraic set of linear equations that define the Minimax solution, regardless
if it contains pure or mixed strategies [44, 14]. However, nonzero-sum games
are inherently much more complex and require non-trivial solution approaches,
usually via some Linear Programming (constraint) optimization procedure, e.g.
see: [20, 43]. In fact, it has been proven that the general task of finding the
Nash equilibria is algorithmically intractable3 [12, 10, 11, 34] - something that
3 In their seminal works, Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou have shown that the task
of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete; informally, PPAD is the class of all search
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Tab. 5: The general analytical (matrix) form of a 2x2 nonzero-sum symmetric
game.
Game
template
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (R,R) (S,T )D (T,S ) (P,P)
puts into a “philosophical” question the very nature and practical usefulness of
having proof of game solutions (i.e., stable outcomes) that we may not be able
to calculate.
Some cases of nonzero-sum games are particularly interesting, especially
when they involve symmetric configurations. The players can switch places,
the actual payoff values are usually of much less importance than their relative
ordering as a simple preference list, the Minimax and Nash equilibria can be
easily identified, yet these simple games seem to capture the very essence of
bargaining and strategic play in a vast set of real-world conflict situations with
no trivial outcomes.
Table 5 shows a generic template for such very simple symmetric nonzero-
sum games, employing only two strategies and four payoff values to completely
define such games in analytical (matrix) form. Here, the game is symmetric
because the players can switch roles without any effect in their corresponding
payoff pairs. Furthermore, they share two common strategies C and D, named
typically after the choices of “cooperate” or “defect”, while constants P, R, S
and T are the real-valued payoffs in each case [7].
In practice, a player’s preference of strategies (and hence, the equilibria)
depends only on the relative ordering of the corresponding payoffs and not their
exact values, which become of real importance only when the actual payoff value
of the game solution is to be calculated for each player. There is a finite number
of rank combinations, i.e., permutations, of these four constants, which produce
all the possible unique game matrices of this type. Specifically, there are 4! = 24
different ways to order these four numbers, 12 of which can be discarded as
qualitatively equivalent to other game configurations. Out of the 12 remaining
games, eight of them possess optimal pure strategies for both players, therefore
they can be considered trivial in terms of calculating their solution. The four
remaining configurations are the most interesting ones, as they do not possess
any optimal pure strategy. These are the following:
• Leader : T > S > R > P .
• Battle of the Sexes: S > T > R > P .
• Chicken: T > R > S > P .
• Prisoner’s Dilemma: T > R > P > S.
These four qualitatively unique games seem to capture the essence of most
of the majority real-world conflict situations historically. Although they have
problems which always have a solution and whose proof is based on the parity argument for
directed graphs. Due to the proof of intractability, the existence of Nash equilibrium in all
nonzero-sum games somewhat loses its credibility as a predictor of behavior.
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Tab. 6: The typical setup of the Leader game with two players. Nash equilibria
are marked with paired asterisks and the Minimax solution with bold
numbers.
Leader
game
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (2,2) (3*,4*)D (4*,3*) (1,1)
been studied extensively in the past, there are still many open research topics
regarding the feasibility, tractability and stability of the theoretical solutions.
4.1 Leader
The Leader or Coordination game [28, 33, 46, 44, 7, 16] is named after the
typical problem of two drivers attempting to enter a stream of increased traffic
from opposite sides of an intersection. When the road is clear, each driver has
to decide whether to move in immediately or concede and wait for the other
driver to move first. If both drivers move in (i.e., choose D), they risk crashing
onto each other, while if they both wait (i.e., choose C ), they will waste time
and possibly the opportunity to enter the traffic. The former case is the worst,
hence the payoff of (1,1), while the later case is slightly more preferable with a
payoff of (2,2). The best outcome is for one driver to become the “leader” and
move first, while the other becomes the “follower” and move second. There is
still some difference in their absolute gains, but now the deadlock is resolved
in the best possible way, no matter who is actually the leader and who is the
follower.
Table 6 illustrates the analytical form of this game setup, where numbers
indicate relative preferences rather than absolute gain values. There are two
pure Nash equilibria, (3,4) and (4,3), which correspond to the proper assignment
of roles to the players, explicitly or implicitly, such that coordination is achieved.
Since the game is symmetric the two players can switch roles, with only marginal
increase/decrease to their payoffs. In terms of Minimax strategies, each player
is free to choose the strategy that guarantees the maximum-of-the-minimums
without any concern about the opponent’s payoffs, since this is a nonzero-sum
game. Hence, the Minimax solution is [C,C ] at (2,2) marked in bold.
In the real world, the assignment of roles as leader/follower is more effective
when applied explicitly, typically by some external mechanism or a predefined
set of rules. Street signs, traffic policemen and highway code for driving prop-
erly are all such mechanisms for explicit resolution of deadlocks via priority
assignment in traffic.
4.2 Battle of the Sexes
In the Battle of the Sexes game [28, 33, 46, 7, 16], a married couple has to decide
between entertainment options for the evening. The husband prefers one choice,
while the wife prefers another. The problem is that they would both prefer to
concede to the same choice together even if it is not their own, rather than follow
their own choices alone. For example, of he wants to watch a sports match on
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Tab. 7: The typical setup of the Battle of the Sexes game with two players. Nash
equilibria are marked with paired asterisks and the Minimax solution
with bold numbers.
Battle of
the Sexes
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (1,1) (3*,4*)D (4*,3*) (2,2)
TV and she wants to go out for dinner, they both prefer either watching TV or
going out for dinner as long as they are together.
Table 7 illustrates the analytical form of the game, where strategy C is for
conceding to the other’s preference and D is for defecting to his/her own choice.
If they both concede the payoff (1,1) is the worst outcome, since they both
end up miserable and bored. If they both defect the payoff (2,2) is marginally
better for both, but they end up being alone. The two other cases of someone
following the other yields the best payoffs for both, since the game is symmetric
and they can switch places. The outcomes (3,4) and (4,3) are actually the two
Nash equilibria, similarly to the Leader game; however, the Minimax solution
(2,2) here corresponds to both players choosing D (not C as in Leader) as their
best Minimax strategy.
4.3 Chicken
One of the most well-known strategic games is Chicken [15, 26, 28, 33, 46, 7],
dating back at least as far as the Homeric era. Two or more adversaries engage
in a very dangerous or even lethal confrontation, each having a set of choices at
his/her disposal and each of these choices producing more or less damage to all
players if their choice is the same. Typically, this translates to the Hollywood’s
favorite version of two cars speeding towards each other, the drivers can choose
to turn and avoid collision or keep the course and risk death if the other driver do
not turn either. The game seems simple enough, but there are several theoretical
implications that make it one of the most challenging situations, appearing in
many real-world conflicts throughout History.
Table 8 illustrates the typical Chicken game setup with two players and two
strategic choices. Option C corresponds to turning away (“swerve”) and losing
the game, while option D corresponds to keeping the course and risk death.
The worst possible outcome is at (1,1) when players persist in keeping course
and eventually crashing against each other. The mutually beneficial outcome
or “draw” is at (3,3) when both players decide to play safe and turn away; this
is actually the Minimax solution of the game, i.e., the most conservative and
“rational” outcome if the game is a one-off round. On the other hand, there are
two Nash equilibria for the two outcomes when only one player turns away and
one persists.
One particularly interesting feature of the Chicken game is that it is impos-
sible to avoid playing it with some insistent adversary, since refusing to play
is effectively equivalent to choosing C (swerve). Furthermore, the player who
succeeds in making his/her commitment to D adequately convincing is always
the one that can win at the expense of the other player, assuming that the other
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Tab. 8: The typical setup of the Chicken game with two players. Nash equilibria
are marked with paired asterisks and the Minimax solution with bold
numbers.
Chicken
game
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (3,3) (2*,4*)D (4*,2*) (1,1)
player is rational and would inevitably decide to avoid disaster. In other words,
the player that is somehow bounded to avoid losing at any cost and makes this
commitment very clear to the opponent, is the one that will always win against
any rational player.
This aspect of credible commitment is closely related to the notion of repu-
tation, as well as the strange conclusion that in this game the most effectively
“rational” strategy is the manifestation of “irrational” commitment to lethal risk.
This becomes especially relevant in cases where the game is played a number
of times repeatedly and previous behaviors directly affect the players’ strategic
choices in the future: once the risky player starts winning he/she may maintain
or even improve this advantage, as confidence and prior “risky” behavior makes
it more and more difficult for future opponents to decide and deviate from their
cautious Minimax choice of swerving. The Chicken game is perhaps the most
descriptive and simple case where players’ previous behavior (i.e., reputation)
is of such importance for predicting the actual outcome.
4.4 Prisoner’s Dilemma
This forth basic type of non-trivial, nonzero-sum game is by far the most inter-
esting one. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game [15, 26, 28, 33, 46, 44, 7, 16] typically
involves two prisoners who are accused of a crime. Each of them has the option
of remaining silent and withholding any information or confessing to the police
and accusing the other by disclosing details about the crime. The first choice C
is effectively the cooperative option, while the second choice D corresponds to
purely competitive behavior in order to reduce he/her own damages.
Table 9 illustrates the typical Prisoner’s Dilemma game setup with two play-
ers and two strategic choices. The payoffs here correspond simply to preferences
and not real gain/cost values, but the essence and the strategic properties of
the game remain intact. In practice, what the game matrix says is that if the
two prisoner’s remain silent, i.e., mutually cooperate, they will not be freed but
they will share an equal, relatively mild conviction. If they both talk and accuse
each other, i.e., mutually defect, they will share and equal but more severe con-
viction. If only one of them talks to the police and the other remains silent, the
one that talked is freed and the other serves a full-time conviction for both. It
is of course imperative that the two prisoners are immediately separated upon
capture and no communication between them is allowed; this does not nullifies
any prior arrangements they may have, but isolation after being captured means
that neither of them can confirm they loyalty of the other. This is one of the
main reasons why police always isolates suspects prior and during any similar
investigation.
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Tab. 9: The typical setup of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with two players.
Nash equilibria are marked with paired asterisks and the Minimax so-
lution with bold numbers.
Prisoner’s
Dilemma
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (3,3) (1,4*)D (4*,1) (2*,2*)
The real beauty and singularity of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that it implies
a paradox. A quick analysis of the payoffs in Table 9 yields two extremes at (1,4)
and (4,1), corresponding to the two interchangeable cases one player cooperating
(C ) and one not (D), but in contrast to the three previous games these are not
Nash equilibria. There is only one Nash equilibrium at (2,2), which is in fact
the Minimax solution too. This means that under the solution concepts of both
Minimax strategy and Nash equilibrium, theory suggests that the two prisoner’s
will probably choose to betray one another, despite any previous arrangements.
It is clearly evident that the outcome (3,3) is mutually beneficial and at the
same time unattainable due to lack of communication. However, in therms of
strict personal gain, defecting (D) is the dominant strategy for both and neither
of them has any incentive to deviate from it. In other words, it appears that
defecting is always the optimal choice regardless of what the other prisoner does
- but if both adopt the same rationale, they will end up at (2,2) which is clearly
worse than the (3,3) that they could have gotten if they had chosen mutual
cooperation.
The essence of the paradox of Prisoner’s Dilemma lies in the inherent conflict
between individual and collective rationality. While individual rationality is
well-understood, collective rationality deals with the scope of optimizing the
mutual gain of the players. This is not a default behavior in strictly competitive
situations, as in zero-sum games, or nonzero-sum games that do not imply
cooperation. However, nonzero-sum games permit the idea of mutually optimal
gains as a combination of simultaneously optimal separate payoffs. Under this
broader scope, even (4,1) and (1,4) are worse than (3,3) since they yield a sum
of 5 in gain value rather than 6, respectively.
It should also be noted that the single Nash equilibrium in Prisoner’s Dilemma
is stable, while the corresponding pairs of Nash equilibria in the three previous
games are inherently unstable, since the players are not in agreement as to
which of the two equilibria is preferable. Furthermore, in the three previous
games the worst possible outcome comes when both players choose their non-
Minimax strategy; in Prisoner’s Dilemma this is not so. In fact, Prisoner’s
Dilemma has produced lengthy academic debates and hundreds of studies in a
wide range of disciplines, from Game Theory and Mathematics to Sociology and
Evolutionary Biology. The paradox of this game (as described above) has been
illustrated as a notorious example where theory often fails to predict the true
“gaming” outcomes in the real world: cooperation can emerge spontaneously,
even though theory says it should not [1, 2, 27, 7].
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Summary:
• There are four basic nonzero-sum game types of particular interest
namely: Leader (or Coordination), Battle of the Sexes, Chicken and
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
• Three of these games (except Prisoner’s Dilemma) have two “mir-
rored” pure Nash equilibria and players receive the worst possible pay-
off when they choose to deviate from their optimal Minimax strategy.
• Prisoner’s Dilemma is a very unique type of game, since neither Min-
imax solution or Nash equilibrium (single one in this case) point to
the best mutually beneficial outcome; this is informally labeled as the
paradox of this game.
5 Signals, mechanisms & rationality
Game formulation and representation in analytical or extensive form are imper-
ative for proper analysis and identification of equilibria. However, they fail to
capture many elements of gaming as a multi-aspect process, especially in rela-
tion to strategic moves; these are actions performed by the players at different
places and times, even before the realization of the current game, with the goal of
enhancing strategic advantages and increasing the effectiveness of chosen strate-
gies. Sometimes the “moves” are no more than message exchanges between the
players, explicit or implicit, or simply tracking the history of previous choices
in iterated games. Formulating these factors into a proper mathematical model
can be very difficult, but nevertheless they are matters of great importance in
real-world conflict situations.
5.1 Signals, carriers & bluffs
The exchange of messages between the players is a very useful option when a
player is trying to model or even predict the behavior of its opponent(s). A
message or signal from one player to another may be voluntary or involuntary,
direct or indirect, explicit or implicit [46, 44]. In any case, it carries some sort
of strategic information, which is always valuable to the other player if it can be
asserted as credible with a high degree of confidence. On the other hand, if this
credibility can be manipulated and falsely asserted as such, the source player
may gain some strategic advantage by means of deceiving its opponent.
Strategic signaling is the process of information exchange between two or
more players in a game, using any means or intermediate third-parties as car-
riers. If the source player does this deliberately, the purpose is to project some
strategic preference or stance (“posturing”) in the game without making any ac-
tual “move”, in order to intimidate or coordinate with the opponent(s). This is
particularly useful in situations where mutually beneficial equilibria are achiev-
able but lack of preference ranking can lead to disastrous lack of coordination.
The Leader and Battle of the Sexes games are such examples (see Tables 6 and
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7). On the other hand, if the source player signals its opponent unintention-
ally, this strategic information could be a “leak” of such importance that may
determine the actual outcome of the game.
Explicit signaling means that the source player sends out a clear message
with undeniable association and content. An explicit signal may be volun-
tary or involuntary; in the later case, the message is simply a “leak” with very
clear origin and content. Implicit signaling happens when the origin or (most
commonly) the content of the message is somehow inconclusive or “plausibly
deniable” as to the intentions of the source player. A signal exchange may occur
directly between the players or via a third-party that performs the role of a car-
rier. A number of combinations of these attributes are possible in practice, em-
ploying direct/indirect messaging, voluntary/involuntary information exchange,
with explicit/implicit messages. For example, a third-party carrier may share
an implicit signal or “leaked” (involuntary) information about a player’s stance
with another player, participating in the game only as a mediator, coordinator
or “referee”, rather than an actively involved player.
A very special type of signaling is when the message exchange involves false
information, i.e., a bluff. This kind of signals is a very common practice in
games of imperfect and/or incomplete information, where the players do not
have a complete view of the game structure itself and/or the opponents’ choices,
respectively. In this case, false signaling or bluffing is usually a strategic option
by itself, exploiting this uncertainty regarding the true status of the game to
enhance advantages or mitigate disadvantages. A very common example of
such games is Poker, where a player with weaker deck of cards can project a
false stance to its opponents, in order to avoid defeat or even secure a victory
against players with better decks of cards [46, 44]. Bluffing can be realized
directly between players or indirectly via a third-party carrier. In the later case,
especially when the signaling is implicit and assumed involuntary, the credibility
of the assertion is strongly associated with the credibility of the carrier itself.
In other words, even if the source player could not project a successful bluff on
its own, a credible third-party carrier might be the necessary intermediate to
achieve such a move. The role of third-party mediators in signaling is a special
topic in the study of strategic moves and how they affect the final outcome in
games.
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Summary:
• A signal between players is a voluntary or involuntary, direct or indi-
rect, explicit or implicit exchange of a message; it is usually a declara-
tion of stance (“posture”) in the game, i.e., intent to include or exclude
a strategy from a set of open options.
• Strategic moves, e.g. signaling, project some strategic preference with-
out making any actual “move”, in order to intimidate or coordinate
with the other player(s).
• A bluff is a projection of false information, i.e., exploiting the incom-
plete/imperfect information structure of a game to gain some strate-
gic advantage that could not be achievable if the game was of com-
plete/perfect information.
5.2 Credibility, reputation, promises & threats
The effectiveness of projecting a strategic stance via signaling, regardless if it
is true or bluff, depends heavily on the credibility of that signal, as well as
the credibility of the player itself [46, 44]. When it comes to a single signal
or stance, the credibility is closely linked to the level of compatibility of that
signal or stance with the rationality of the player. Although rationality per se
may be only an assumption with regard to one’s opponent, in general terms it
is fairly easy to examine the matrix or the tree-graph representation of a game
and establish whether a declared stance is beneficial or not to the associated
player. In other words, if that player is assumed to behave rationally, Minimax
strategies and Nash equilibria can be used to filter out choices that are clearly
excluded, at least with a high probability.
The set of previous stances and/or moves, as well as their associated cred-
ibility values, can be used as the history or reputation of that player, which
is in fact the a priori probability for any future stance and/or move of being
consistent with its previous behavior [27]. Since games of complete and perfect
information, e.g. Chess, are not compatible with false signaling and bluffs, the
true theoretical aspect of credibility and reputation is relevant only in games
of incomplete and/or imperfect information. Hence, Poker players are indeed
characterized as being cautious or risk-takers according to their reputation on
using bluffs in lower or higher frequency, respectively.
A player with a specific reputation can signal a specific stance to the others,
projecting either a promise or a threat. A promise is a signal that usually
declares the intent to cooperate, i.e., choose the less aggressive approach. This
is particularly useful when the players need to coordinate in order to avoid much
worse outcomes, as in the games Leader and Battle of the Sexes (see Tables 6
and 7). On the other hand, a threat is a signal that usually declares the intent
to compete, i.e., choose the more aggressive approach. This is still useful as the
means to enforce some kind of coordination, now in the form of extortion rather
than willful cooperation. The Chicken game is such any example (see Table 8),
where one player must force the other to swerve, in order to naturally end up
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in one of the two Nash equilibria and avoid the worst outcome of crash.
As it was mentioned earlier, Prisoner’s Dilemma is a very special type of
game, since neither Minimax solution or Nash equilibrium points to the mutually
beneficial option of cooperation; however, if signaling between the prisoners is
possible, i.e., if they are allowed to communicate with each other, cooperation
becomes much more plausible: all they have to do is to promise each other to
remain silent and threat to accuse the other as a retaliation if they see the other
doing such thing. One of the most interesting topics in modern Game Theory is
the study and analytical formulation of the conditions, the constraints and the
exact processes of the evolution of cooperation in games like Prisoner’s Dilemma,
where typical theory fails to predict optimal strategies, although such strategies
seem to exist, usually in accordance to some Tit-for-Tat variation [1, 2, 27, 7].
In any case, whether it is a promise or a threat, the signal or stance is labeled
as credible or not. Hence, a credible promise is one that comes from a player
with a reputation of being consistently reliable in fulfilling that promise, i.e.,
actually choosing less aggressive strategies when signaling intent to cooperate.
Similarly, a credible threat is one that comes from a player with a reputation of
being consistently reliable in fulfilling that threat, i.e., actually choosing more
aggressive strategies when signaling intent to compete [28, 33].
Summary:
• Promise is a signal that usually declares the intent to cooperate, i.e.,
choose the less aggressive approach; it is useful when players need to
coordinate in order to avoid much worse outcomes.
• Threat is a signal that usually declares the intent to compete, i.e.,
choose the more aggressive approach; it is useful a player wants to
enforce some kind of coordination, in the form of extortion.
• Credibility is closely linked to the level of compatibility of a signal or
stance with the rationality of the player; in practice, it is a measure
(probability) of whether the player will fulfill a promise or a threat, if
necessary.
• Reputation of a player is the a priori probability for any future stance
and/or move of being consistent with its previous behavior.
• Credible promises and credible threats are associated with the reputa-
tion and credibility of each player, as well as the actual payoffs in the
corresponding game matrix.
5.3 Utility, incentives & “rational irrationality”
As it was mentioned earlier, if that player is assumed to behave rationally, i.e.,
trying to minimize losses and maximize gains in terms of actual payoffs in each
outcome, the credibility of a promise or a threat can be easily established with
a high probability. Nevertheless, the fact that this is just a probability and not
a perfect forecast comes from the fact that, in turn, the level of rationality of
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Tab. 10: The typical setup of the Hostage Situation game with two players.
Player-1 is the assaulter and Player-2 is the rescuer-protector.
Hostage
Situation
Player-2
C D
Player-1 C (2,3) (1,4*)D (4*,2*) (3*,1)
that player cannot be evaluated perfectly and in exact terms.
Rationality and incentives of a player emerge naturally from the exact for-
mulation of its own utility function, which is nothing more than a generalization
of the loss/gain function that is described by the matrix or the tree-graph of
the game [33, 16, 28]. If the formulation of the game’s payoff matrix is perfect,
then it is clear when a strategy is optimal for a player and when it is not. How-
ever, the truth is that these payoff values may not reflect the exact utility, i.e.,
overall loss/gain value for that player, usually due to some “hidden” outcomes
or side-effects. For example, a game matrix may describe the payoffs for each
outcome and each player correctly, but with the assumption that these players
are rational in the same way: winning over their opponent; this may not be
true, e.g. when one player cares more about securing that their opponent does
not win, rather than securing their own win. In other words, when the play-
ers’ rationality is not symmetrically the same, then they do not share the same
utility function and the true payoffs in the game matrix may actually be quite
different.
A very classic example of such games, assumed to be symmetric when they
are actually asymmetric by nature, is the Hostage Situation, described in ana-
lytical form by Table 10. If the two opponents are treated as similarly rational,
i.e., symmetric in terms of incentives and behavior, then the game is not much
different than the classic Chicken, where one must convince the other to swerve
first, in order to avoid the crash. This translates to either the authorities give
in to the assaulter’s demands or the assaulter eventually surrenders to the au-
thorities, both outcomes assumed to be equally rational, correspondingly, to
each player. However, if for some reason the assaulter is more determined than
initially presumed, preferring to fight to the death rather than surrendering and
ending up in jail, then the game is inherently asymmetric and the payoff matrix
is quite different, as illustrated in Table 10. What the matrix shows is that
now Player-1, i.e., the assaulter, has a dominant strategy of always choosing the
most aggressive stance, no matter what the authorities choose to do. There is
no pure Minimax solution here, since there is no pure saddle-point (see payoffs
“3” and “2” in bold); however, there is now a single Nash equilibrium at (4,2),
i.e., aggressive assaulter and passive authorities - this is in fact the standard ap-
proach internationally in all hostage situations: the authorities start with trying
to establish a communication link and negotiate with the assaulter, rather than
choosing a rescue operation by direct action that could put the hostages in
danger.
As it is evident from the Hostage Situation game of Table 10, the authorities
are normally guided to a more passive and cooperative approach of negotiating
rather than using force, because the incentive is to protect the hostages at all
costs. This effectively translates to employing a utility function that includes
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Tab. 11: The typical setup of the Kamikaze game with two players. Player-1 is
the “kamikaze” and Player-2 is the defender.
Kamikaze Player-2C D
Player-1 C (2,3) (1,4*)D (4*,1 ) (3*,2*)
a high priority on the hostages’ lives, higher than the immediate capture or
incapacitation of the assaulter. Hence, the rationality of Player-2 dictates a more
passive, cooperative stance. This changes drastically if, during this evolution,
the lives of hostages are put in severe danger, e.g. when the assaulter poses a
very credible threat or actually harms a hostage (assuming there are more). In
this case, the authorities should change stance and employ the more aggressive
option, because this is now the optimal response.
Table 11 illustrates the Kamikaze game, which is actually a slightly modified
Hostage Situation game in terms of payoff matrix. The game is still asymmetric
and the only variation is the swapping of payoff values {2} and {1} for Player-
2 (marked in italics), which illustrates the new fact that at this point it is
more harmful for the hostages to remain idle rather than using direct force to
rescue them, even if this too poses some danger to them - again, this is exactly
the standard approach internationally in all hostage situations: the authorities
follow strict rules-of-engagement which state that, once it is established that the
lives of hostages is in clear and severe danger, direct action is to be employed
immediately. The same setup emerges when the Kamikaze game is studied
according to its name: when one player (assaulter) is more concerned about
damaging the opponent (defender) rather than protecting itself, then there is
indeed a dominant strategy of always choosing the most aggressive stance, no
matter what the defender chooses to do. Likewise, the defender is now forced to
choose between its two worst outcomes and naturally chooses the less damaging
one, i.e., direct counter-action rather than swerve. Here, the passive stance
is established as more damaging than all-out-conflict, exactly as in Hostage
Situation with a very aggressive assaulter. In terms of game analysis, now
there is indeed a pure Minimax solution at (3,2), which is also the single Nash
equilibrium of the game. This explains why there is practically no other rational
(strategically optimal) way to defend against a murderous hostage-taker or a
desperate kamikaze than employing equally aggressive response.
The concepts described along the strategic analysis and “rationalization”
of the players in games like Hostage Situation and Kamikaze illustrate how a
seemingly irrational course of actions can be easily explained and even classified
as rational behavior, if the proper utility functions are employed. In other words,
if the utility of each and every player is defined correctly, then all players in any
game can be labeled as “rational” ones. This proposition is often referred to
as “rational irrationality” (valid/explainable behavior), rather than “irrational
rationality” (incomprehensible behavior) [27].
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Summary:
• Utility is the generalized cost/gain function of a player in a specific
game, depending on the outcomes but including any “hidden” regards
and side-effects.
• Given a specific utility function, a player’s incentives emerge naturally
as the rational behavior of the underlying payoff-optimization process.
• A player’s behavior may seem “irrational” if its utility function is in-
complete; given a properly defined utility function, a player’s behavior
can always be labeled as rational per se.
• Hostage Situation and Kamikaze are two examples of (asymmetric)
stand-off games where the notion of “rational irrationality” is fully
explained via proper definition of the corresponding utility functions
for the assaulter.
6 The frontier
This paper included only some of the most basic concepts of Game Theory,
including solution methods and representations of typical games of special in-
terest, like Chicken and Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, these are only a scratch
on the surface of what lies beneath, the rigorous mathematical theory and the
complex, some still unsolved, problems in this extremely interesting and useful
scientific area.
All the games and setups presented thus far was somewhat “too perfect”,
too simple compared to real-world situations of conflict. There are few cases
where only two players are involved, their moves are full observable and their
incentives clear and consistent. In most conflicts, groups of players are spiraling
in alternating rounds competing and cooperating, each knowing its own utility
function and very little about the others’, while signaling, third-party credibility
assertions and continuous bargaining are common things. Is there really a way
Game Theory can address all these aspects in the same clarity, mathematical
robustness and universality as is does with simple cases of zero-sum and nonzero-
sum games like the ones presented previously?
The short answer is “No”. Game Theory is the mathematical way to approach
some of the most complex problems the human mind has ever encountered. For
example, what are the prerequisites, the dynamics and the survivability of the
evolution of cooperation as a strategy, in human or animal societies? What is
the asymptotic behavior of such “cooperative” groups? Can they survive in an
environment of pure competition? These issues are addressed in other aspects
of the theory, namely the Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS), not analyzed in
this study. In short, ESS are patterns of behavior in games of pure competition
and/or possible cooperation, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, that not only may
emerge spontaneously but also survive as optimal strategies in iterative games.
Tit-for-Tat [1, 2] is such an example of ESS in iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma:
cooperation can emerge spontaneously given a set of conditions, primarily (a)
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players “start nicely”, (b) continue with reciprocity, (c) don’t know when the
game finishes. Although it seems simple enough, spontaneous cooperation in
conflict situations is one of the most intriguing and theoretically complex prob-
lems in Game Theory today.
In a slightly simpler scenario, a player may be involved in a game with
another player, while at the same time its strategic choices are relevant to a
second game, with some other player. For example, a politician may be in a
“bargain” with voters, trying to gain their support by promising specific actions
if elected, while at the same time a second “bargain” may be taking place in
parallel with the party’s main policies and governmental plan if it comes to
power. If some of that politician’s promises are on conflict with the party’s main
lines, then as a player is involved in what is called a two-level game [39, 38].
This form of gaming was first proposed by Putnam in the late ’70s and it models
two-level or multi-level conflict situations in general, where the strategic choices
of a player affect two or more simultaneous games. The solution concepts and
equilibria are not much different than those of simple games, but now a strategy
is optimal and produces a stable outcome only if it is such simultaneously in all
these games.
Another very interesting aspect of gaming in general is the evolution of
strategies and each player’s behavior as each observes the others’ moves. In
single-step games, the Minimax solution (pure or mixed) is the one that dic-
tates the optimal strategy for each player. The concept of iterative gaming is
much more general, since it includes cases where the same players may face one
another in the same single-step games many times in the future. In this case,
Nash equilibria predict the most probable outcomes with much better accuracy.
But the knowledge that there will be a “next round”, especially when players
alternate moves and one can observe the other before making its own (e.g. in
Chess), then the game analysis can expand to two or more steps ahead. In prac-
tice, the player does not only take into account the strategic choices available
to the opponent(s) but also the “what if” combinations of moves-countermoves.
Hence, the corresponding game matrix includes these combinations of composite
states on the opponent(s) side and the payoffs are estimated accordingly. This
type of composite multi-step setup is often referred to as a metagame [46]. The
extended-form representation of metagames is more natural than the analytical
(matrix) form, but the identification of equilibria and solutions is somewhat less
straight-forward.
Some games involve elements of chance regarding the game’s state or partial
information regarding the observability of each player’s moves. In such games
of imperfect information, modeling via a game matrix or a tree-graph can be
problematic, since many of the paths may be mutually exclusive and not just
alternative choices. In the ’60s, very early on in the history of Game Theory,
Harsanyi introduced the so-called Harsanyi transformation [21, 22, 28] for trans-
forming a game of incomplete information to an equivalent game of complete
but imperfect information. This may not seem much, but in reality there is a
very distinct and important difference between them. If a random event dic-
tates the exact structure and payoffs of the games, perhaps even the strategic
behavior of the players, then the analysis of such a game is inherently a very dif-
ficult task. On the other hand, the Harsanyi transformation models this random
event as a deterministic one, removing the element of chance and introducing
the notion of “hidden” information about it. In practice, this results in creating
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multiple variations of the game, one for each possible configuration, and treating
them separately. After they are individually analyzed, solutions and equilibria
are combined together within a probabilistic framework, introducing the more
generalized concept of Bayesian Nash equilibria [28].
In real-world conflict situations it is not uncommon that one or some of the
players have a different knowledge or “view” of the game structure, its payoffs
and the other players’ preferences. This means that each player acts upon its
own payoff matrix, possibly very different in structure and values than the one
used by the other players. Of course, all players are involved in the same, single
game and the payoffs on each outcome is effectively a single one, despite each
player’s unique view of the game. This is extremely important if some of the
players have a more complete view of the game, i.e., when they address the
game as one of (almost) complete information, while some opponents address
it as one of incomplete information. These special types of conflict are often
referred to as hypergames [47, 4]. Introduced by Bennett and Dando in late
’70s and later revised in the ’00s by Vane and others, hypergames is a very
efficient way to describe games of asymmetric information between players by
employing different variations of the game matrix or tree-graph, according to
each player’s view. In practice, hypergames are treated the same way as simple
games, with each player deciding its strategic choices according to its own view
and, subsequently, combining the (partial) outcomes together.
Game Theory is a vast scientific and research area, based almost entirely on
Mathematics and some experimental methods, with applications that vary from
simple board games and auctions to Evolutionary Psychology and Sociology-
Biology in group behavior of humans and animals. Although real-world situa-
tions reveal that sometimes its predictive value is limited, the robust theoretical
framework and solution concepts provide an extremely valuable set of tools that
clarifies the inner workings and dynamics of conflict situations.
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Summary:
• In accordance to Nash’s bargaining theorem, cooperation can emerge
spontaneously, even in competitive games, when a specific set of pre-
requisites are satisfied.
• Evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are patterns of behavior in games
of pure competition and/or possible cooperation that survive as opti-
mal strategies in iterative games.
• In two-level games, a player may be involved in a game with another
player, while at the same time its strategic choices are relevant to a
second game, with some other player.
• Metagames are multi-step game setups where the corresponding game
matrix includes combinations of “what if” composite states, regarding
the future strategic choices of the opponent(s).
• The Harsanyi transformation is used in games of incomplete infor-
mation, e.g. when the game structure and payoffs depend on some
random event, to transform it to an equivalent game of complete but
imperfect information.
• Hypergames is a very efficient way to describe games of asymmetric
information between players by employing different variations of the
game matrix or tree-graph, according to each player’s view.
• In general, Game Theory is a vast scientific and research area with
robust theoretical foundation that can be used as a predictive tool, as
well as (mostly) an extremely valuable approach to analyze conflict
situations.
Acknowledgement: This work is dedicated to John F. Nash, pioneer and
mathematical genius, who was killed earlier this month on May 23th 2015 in a
car accident along with his wife Alicia. His inspirational work and breakthrough
ideas has changed Game Theory and Economics forever.
6 The frontier 34
References
[1] R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, NY: 1984, 1984.
[2] R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science,
242 (1988), 1385-1390, 1988.
[3] R. Ben-Yashar and S. Nitzan. Optimal decision rules for fixed-size com-
mittees in polychotomous choice situations. Social Choice and Welfare, 18
(2001) 737-746, 2001.
[4] P. G. Bennett and M. R. Dando. Complex strategic analysis: A study of
the fall of france. Journal of Operational Research Society, 33, pp.41-50,
1979.
[5] S. Berg. Indirect voting systems: Banzhaf numbers, majority functions and
collective competence. Eur. J. Pol. Econ., 13 (1997), pp.557-573, 1997.
[6] C. Camerer, T. Ho, and K. Chong. Behavioral game theory: Thinking,
learning, and teaching. Learning and Teaching (November 13, 2001) -
Caltech Working Paper, 2002.
[7] J. L. Casti. Reality Rules II: Picturing the world in Mathematics - The
Frontier. John Wiley & Sons, 1997.
[8] P.-L. Chang, V. Chua, and M. Machover. L s penrose’s limit theorem: Tests
by simulation. Mathematical Social Sciences, 51 (2006) 90-106, 2006.
[9] Marquis de Condorcet. An essay on the application of probability the-
ory to plurality decision making: An election between three candidates.
Sommerland and Mclean (1989) 66-80, 1989.
[10] C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, and Ch. Papadimitriou. The complexity of
computing a nash equilibrium. Communications of the ACM, 52(2):89-97,
2009, 2009.
[11] C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, and Ch. Papadimitriou. The complexity of
computing a nash equilibrium. SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(1):195-
259, 2009, 2009.
[12] C. Daskalakis and Ch. Papadimitriou. The complexity of computing a nash
equilibrium. In 38th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
2006), 2006.
[13] A. Dixit and B. Nalebuff. Game theory (2nd/ed.). The Concise Encyclo-
pedia of Economics, 2008.
[14] M. Dresher. Games of Strategy – Theory and Applications. Prentice-Hall
/ RAND Corp, USA: 1961, 1961.
[15] T. S. Ferguson. Game Theory (2nd/Ed). Mathematics Department, UCLA:
2014, 2014.
[16] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press, 1991.
6 The frontier 35
[17] H. Georgiou. Collective decision efficiency and optimal voting mechanisms:
A comprehensive overview for multi-classifier models. arXiv.org preprint
(en)(arXiv:1502.02191v1 [cs.GT]), 2015.
[18] H. Georgiou and M. Mavroforakis. A game-theoretic framework for classi-
fier ensembles using weighted majority voting with local accuracy estimates.
arXiv.org preprint (en)(arXiv:1302.0540v1 [cs.LG]), 2013.
[19] H. Georgiou, M. Mavroforakis, and S. Theodoridis. A game-theoretic ap-
proach to weighted majority voting for combining svm classifiers. In Int.
Conf. on ANN (ICANN), 10-13 Sept. 2006, Athens, Greece, in: S.Kollias,
et al. (Eds.): ICANN 2006, Part I, LNCS 4131, 2006, pp. 284-292, 2006.
[20] S. Gu. Game theory and linear programming. Duke University, CS lecture
presentation (2008), 2008.
[21] J. C. Harsanyi. Bargaining in ignorance of the opponent’s utility function.
Journal of Conflict Resolution (1962), 1962.
[22] J. C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by bayesian
players, i-iii. Management Science, 14, pp.159-182,320-332,468-502 (1967),
1967.
[23] D. Karotkin. The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority
games. Games and Econ.Beh., 22 (1998), pp.299-315, 1998.
[24] L. Kuncheva. Combing Pattern Classifiers - Methods and Algorithms. Wi-
ley, 2004.
[25] R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa. Games and Decisions. Wiley, New York, 1957.
[26] M. Maschler, E. Solan, and S. Zamir. Game Theory. Cambridge University
Press: 2013, 2013.
[27] L. Mero. Moral Calculations - Game Theory, Logic and Human Frailty.
Springer-Verlag, New York, 1998.
[28] C. Montet and D. Serra. Game Theory and Economics. Palgrave Macmil-
lan, New York, 2003.
[29] J.F. Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Math., 54 (1950) pp.286-295,
1950.
[30] J.F. Nash. Non-cooperative games (phd dissertation). PhD dissertation,
Princeton University, 1950.
[31] N. J. Nilsson. Artificial Intelligence: A New Synthesis. Elsevier / Morgan
Kaufmann, 1998.
[32] S. Nitzan and J. Paroush. Optimal decision rules in uncertain dichotomous
choice situations. International Economic Review, 23 (1982) 289-297, 1982.
[33] G. Owen. Game Theory (3rd/Ed). Academic Press, 1995.
[34] Ch. Papadimitriou. Complexity of finding a nash equilibrium. Berkeley
University (EE-CS), lecture notes (2011), 2011.
6 The frontier 36
[35] L. S. Penrose. On the objective study of crowd behavior. HK Lewis & Co,
London, 1952.
[36] W. H. Press and F. J. Dyson. Iterated prisoner’s dilemma contains strate-
gies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. PNAS, 109 (26)(2012)
10409-10413, 2012.
[37] J. Prywes. The mathematics of magic: The gathering - a study in proba-
bility, statistics, strategy, and game theory. (draft paper), 1999.
[38] R. D. Putnam. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level
games. International Organization, 42 (3) 1988, 1988.
[39] R. D. Putnam and C. R. Henning. The Bonn summit of 1978: How does
international economic policy coordination actually work? Brookings In-
stitution, USA: 1986, 1986.
[40] S. Russell and P. Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach
(3rd/Ed). Prentice Hall, 2009.
[41] A. Schalk. The Theory of Games and Game Models (CS3191 - lecture
notes). Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester, 2003.
[42] L. Shapley and B. Grofman. Optimizing group judgemental accuracy in
the presence of interdependencies. Public Choice, 43 (1984) 329-343, 1984.
[43] G. Sierksma. Linear and Integer Programming: Theory and Practice
(2nd/Ed). CRC Press: 2001, 2001.
[44] S. Stahl. A gentle Introduction to Game Theory. Mathematical World,
vol.13, American Mathematical Society, 1999.
[45] A. Taylor and W. Zwicker. Weighted voting, multicameral representation
and power. Games and Econ. Beh., 5 (1993), pp.170-181, 1993.
[46] L. C. Thomas. Games, Theory and Applications. Ellis Horwood Ltd, UK,
1984.
[47] R. Vane. Advances in hypergame theory. Workshop on Game Theoretic
and Decision Theoretic Agents – Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems, 2006, 2006.
[48] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1947.
[49] Wikipedia.org. Extended-form game (article).
[50] Wikipedia.org. Rubik’s cube (article).
[51] P. Young. Condorcet’s theory of voting. Amer. Pol. Sci. Review, 82
(4)(1988) 1231-1244, 1988.
6 The frontier 37
Harris Georgiou received his B.Sc. degree in Informatics from University of
Ioannina, Greece, in 1997, and his M.Sc. degree in Digital Signal Processing & Com-
puter Systems and Ph.D. degree in Machine Learning & Medical Imaging, from Na-
tional & Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece, in 2000 and 2009, respectively.
Since 1998, he has been working with the Signal & Image Processing Lab (SIPL) in
the Department of Informatics & Telecommunications (DIT) at National & Kapodis-
trian University of Athens (NKUA/UoA), Greece, in various academic and research
projects. In 2013-2015 he worked as a post-doctorate associate researcher with SIPL in
sparse models for distributed analysis of functional MRI (fMRI) signals. He has been
actively involved in several national and EU-funded research & development projects,
focusing on new and emerging technologies in Biomedicine and applications. He has
also worked in the private sector as a consultant in Software Engineering and Qual-
ity Assurance (SQA, EDP/IT), as well as a faculty professor in private institutions
in various ICT-related subjects, for more than 17 years. His main research interests
include Machine Learning, Pattern Recognition, Signal Processing, Medical Imaging,
Soft Computing, Artificial Intelligence and Game Theory. He has published more than
65 papers and articles (43 peer-reviewed) in various academic journals & conferences,
open-access publications and scientific magazines, as well as two books in Biomedical
Engineering & Computer-Aided Diagnosis and several contributions in seminal aca-
demic textbooks in Machine Learning & Pattern Recognition. He is a member of the
IEEE and the ACM organizations and he has given several technical presentations in
various countries.
